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What is the current state of justice provision in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad? Include the 
following aspects: 
 The different justice systems (state/formal, customary and religious); 
 Advantages and problems/shortcomings in each; 
 Extent to which they are used (citizen uptake), public perceptions of these and reasons 
for choosing one or another; 
 Alignment/linkages and interactions between different justice systems; 
 Impact on legitimacy of the state. 
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1. Summary  
This review looks at justice provision in four countries in the Sahel: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and 
Chad. All feature formal (state) justice systems alongside customary/religious justice, with the 
latter typically being seen by citizens as more accessible, cheaper and less corrupt. State justice 
systems in all the countries face similar challenges: corruption, resource and capacity 
constraints, and political interference. However, there are also significant issues with customary 
justice mechanisms, notably exclusion (or limited participation) of women and other marginalised 
groups.  
This review is based largely on grey literature, in particular studies by think tanks and 
international development partners. While substantial information was found about both the 
formal justice system and customary justice provision in Mali, far less was found about these in 
the other countries, with hardly any on justice provision in Chad.  
Key findings of the review are as follows: 
 Parallel justice systems – all countries feature the existence of both formal (state) 
justice systems alongside customary/traditional justice mechanisms. This reflects both 
the fact that the latter are long-established and accepted – they are the traditional route 
for obtaining justice in many societies – and the major shortcomings in state justice 
provision.  
 Alignment between state and customary justice systems – The degree of formal 
alignment between different justice systems varies from country to country. In general, 
customary mechanisms are recognised in law for settlement of civil disputes and family 
cases. Responsibility for criminal justice tends to rest exclusively with the state. 
 Challenges facing state justice systems – Common issues faced in the formal justice 
system in all countries are lack of resources and capacity, widespread corruption, 
political interference in the judiciary, and lack of awareness among the public about rights 
and legal processes. A more fundamental issue in some (notably Mali) is that the formal 
legal system is based on French law, and is thus alien to the local culture as well as 
being inaccessible because of reasons of cost, language, literacy, distance and so on.  
 Features of customary/religious justice – Customary justice providers include family 
elders, religious leaders, tribal chiefs and other local figures of authority. Customary 
justice provision is convenient (all parties are located near each other), it is cheap (no 
court fees or travel costs incurred), and it is familiar (parties know the mediators, they 
speak their language and have the same culture). Customary and religious justice tend to 
be intertwined, with elements of Sharia (Islamic law) featuring in customary justice 
provision, notably settlement of land/inheritance disputes and personal (family) cases. 
 Challenges facing customary justice mechanisms – Procedures in customary justice 
mechanisms are not always consistent with those required for ‘fair’ trials, e.g. the right of 
the accused to appeal decisions; harsh punishments can be imposed; there can be a 
lack of consistency and of accountability in customary justice provision; and enforcement 
can be problematic, leading to disputes resurfacing. 
 Issues around inclusion in both state and customary justice provision – The 
literature highlights obstacles to participation of women in both the formal system and 
customary justice, albeit the barriers can be somewhat different: in the former, issues 
with access (due to distance, cost, lack of education) and in the latter, due to patriarchal 
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norms. In both systems the exclusion of women reflects the restricted position of women 
in wider society.  
 Perceptions of state and customary justice – In many countries, the state justice 
system is seen by citizens as highly corrupt. People often expressed greater trust in 
traditional leaders and customary justice. A further factor leading people to favour 
customary over formal justice, is that the former is seen as preserving social cohesion 
and the latter often as destroying the social fabric. 
 Legitimacy of the state – While this review focused on perceptions of the justice sector, 
the generally low level of public trust in formal justice systems has obvious (negative) 
implications for public perceptions of the state and its legitimacy.  
This review highlights considerable gaps in the evidence base and the need for more research 
on the challenges facing formal justice systems in the four countries; the prevalence and precise 
nature of customary justice mechanisms; and public perceptions of both, including reasons for 
favouring one or the other. Information on Chad and Burkina Faso is especially limited. A more 
accurate and detailed understanding of justice provision would help identify approaches to 
strengthen justice provision, based on a pragmatic assessment of areas and scope for 
improvement. Clearly, given the constraints facing formal justice systems, there is a role for 
customary justice mechanisms, but safeguards are needed to ensure protection of human rights 
for all.  
2. Mali 
In Mali there are essentially three different systems of law in operation that produce multifaceted 
legal dynamics: ‘the legacy of French colonization, Islamic law, generally applied in the northern 
regions, and customary law, inspired by local practices and traditions’ (IDLO, 2018). Many 
community leaders play several roles at the same time, e.g. traditional chief, imam and mayor: 
‘it’s difficult to find a line of demarcation or distinction between the various traditional authorities’ 
(IDLO, 2018).  
State justice system 
Structure 
The formal justice system in Mali has at the bottom justices of the peace (JPCEs) who combine 
the functions of investigator, prosecutor and judge. The aim was to ensure formal justice was 
available in rural areas, but JPCEs have been widely criticised for concentrating too much power 
in the hands of one person (van Veen et al, 2015: 40). They are being phased out under reforms 
initiated in 1992 and replaced by courts of first instance (Tribuneaux d’instance, TIs), which have 
a separate judge, examining magistrate and prosecutor (van Veen et al 2015: 41).  
Above these TIs are the Tribuneaux de premiere instance (TPIs) which are divided into ordinary 
and specialised courts, and again have a judge, examining magistrate and prosecutor. These are 
also being phased out and replaced with higher courts (Tribuneaux de grande instance or TGIs) 
which will decide cases in panels of three judges rather than through a sole judge. Above these 
are three courts of appeal, located in Bamako, Kayes and Mopti. Above these, the highest courts 
in the state justice system are: a) the Supreme Court, which hears appeals from the lower courts; 
b) the Constitutional Court, which is supposed to balance the branches of government by 
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upholding the law and arbitrating conflicts between state institutions; and c) the High Court of 
Justice which tries cases of high treason, crimes carried out in the exercise of state functions, 
and those involving national security (van Veen et al, 2015: 41).  
At independence, Mali retained the French legal system, which had the potential to ensure equal 
treatment for all on the basis of shared rights and duties, and to enhance transparency through 
its procedural formality and thus strengthen the social contract (van Veen et al, 2015: 23). It thus 
promised consistency, equality and predictability. However, another reason to retain the French 
system was to preserve the advantages of the elite (van Veen et al, 2015: 25).  
Challenges  
Challenges to the state justice system can be divided into those at the political level, systemic 
issues and operational level problems. 
At the political level, the repeated uprisings in the north of the country (four since independence 
in 1960) highlight the failure to create a sense of national identity and countrywide acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the state. This, in turn, makes it difficult ‘to establish a concept of justice that is 
considered legitimate by all and a practice of justice in which its provision is experienced as the 
extension of impartial public authority instead of as an instrument through which state power is 
expressed’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 15). A further issue in Mali is the continued dominance of the 
executive over the state. Mali’s first 31 years after independence were characterised by 
autocratic rule, during which the formal justice system served as an instrument of state: ‘it was 
designed for and tasked with achieving and defending the political objectives of the ruling party, 
especially the interests of its elites’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 16). While a democratic constitution 
was introduced in 1992, the legacy of executive control continues, albeit exercised through 
informal and material controls (e.g. the Ministry of Justice controls the budget of the judiciary and 
the careers of the state’s legal professionals, including public prosecutors and judges) (van Veen 
et al, 2015: 18). ‘In such an executive-dominated context it is difficult to conceive of, and provide, 
justice as an independent public service that can neutrally and effectively arbitrate in disputes 
between citizens, between citizens and the state or even between parts of the state itself’ (van 
Veen et al, 2015: 22). The US State Department’s 2015 Country Human Rights Report for Mali 
also noted that ‘the executive continued to exert influence over the judicial system’ (US State 
Dept., 2015: 8).  
Van Veen et al (2015: 25) argue that retention of the French legal system created ‘permanent 
tension between the justice needs of the population and the type of justice that the state is able 
to provide’. They describe these as systemic weaknesses, inherent to the design of the state’s 
judicial system and not due to the manner in which it operates (– which also means they cannot 
be resolved simply through increased funding). Systemic weaknesses in the state justice system 
include (van Veen et al 2015: 26-28): 
 Complexity – the French system is highly complex, and requires organisations, culture, 
capacities and resources that Mali does not possess. 
 Language – the language of the state justice system is French, but only one-third of Mali’s 
population speak the language and only 10% are fluent in it. About 80% of Malians speak 
or understand Bambara and/or speak one of the country’s 12 additional national 
languages. 
 Illiteracy – adult literacy in Mali is around 33%, which makes the legal system completely 
inaccessible to most without some form of intermediary. 
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 Poverty – 86% of Mali’s population live in multidimensional poverty, with 77% earning less 
than USD2 a day. Mali ranked 176 out of 187 in the 2014 Human Development Index1. 
This means most Malians cannot afford the state justice system – and there are no simple 
and nationally available legal financial aid mechanisms. 
 Population spread – 90% of Mali’s population live in the southern one-third of the country’s 
territory. Justice infrastructure is lacking throughout the country, but especially in rural 
areas and the north, meaning that litigants may have to travel over 200 km to reach the 
nearest court – making the costs unaffordable for most. 
 ‘Culture clash’ – popular expectations of the form and purpose of justice differ from what 
the state has on offer. Malian traditions and culture are seen as tolerant, conflict-avoiding 
and consensus-seeking, which contrasts with the more procedural and punitive character 
of the legal system. Taking someone to court is not seen in a positive light. 
Turning to operational issues hampering the state justice system, these can be summed up as 
endemic corruption, massive competence and capacity constraints, and a general lack of 
resources, ‘compounded by limited allocation and poor utilisation of the resources that do exist’ 
(van Veen et al, 2015: 39).  
Corruption is widespread in the Malian public sector, and especially prevalent in the state 
judiciary. Domestic human rights groups reported in 2015 that bribery and influence-peddling 
were widespread in the courts (US State Dept., 2015). It is useful to differentiate between two 
types of corruption in the judiciary:  
 Individual – corrupt practices that a number of legal professionals engage in on an 
individual basis. This usually entails significant payments on the side to get a favourable 
outcome in the courts (adding to the costs of accessing formal justice in Mali). It stems 
from the comparatively low salaries of judges, and from social pressure on those in the 
justice system to grant favours to family or community members. 
 Systemic corruption – that results from collusion between, for example, elements of the 
executive and the judiciary (van Veen et al, 2015: 42). 
To add to the problem, the state justice system largely fails to prevent and punish abuse of public 
office – within and outside the judiciary – so there is no deterrent against corruption.   
There are significant resource shortfalls in the state justice system in Mali (US State Dept., 
2015). With regard to funding, the average annual allocation over the period 2008-2014 to justice 
in the national budget was 0.63% (van Veen et al, 2015: 44). This suggests provision of justice is 
not a priority of the Malian government, and has obvious impacts in relation to service delivery 
(personnel, facilities, etc.). Conflict in the north has led to a lack of reach of the state justice 
system in that part of the country (Wambua & Logan, 2017; Goff et al, 2017). 
However, van Veen et al (2015) highlight the fact that, even with the limited resources available, 
where judicial system staff show integrity and commitment, they are able to make those 
resources go a long way. Nonetheless, ‘the fact remains that the…resources required for making 
the state justice work as it was intended are significant, and outstrip the ability of the Malian state 
                                                   
1 By 2019, its ranking had fallen to 184 out of 189 countries. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-
development-index-ranking 
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to provide them’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 44). They identify three gaps that stand out because 
simply increasing resources will not solve them in the short run (van Veen et al, 2015: 45): 
 Shortage of competent professionals, in particular judges and lawyers – in 2008 Mali had 
4.8 judges per 100,000 inhabitants (cf. the North African average of 9.8 per 100,000, and 
global average of 11.5 per 100,000). A 2014 report by the Ministry of Justice found there 
were 355 lawyers in Mali at the time, for a population of about 16 million. 
 Absence of adequate legal professional education and training – seen, for example, in lack 
of professional training opportunities, on-the-job refresher courses, lack of access to legal 
reference works. The result is that many legal professionals, in particular court registrars, 
do not perform adequately as they lack sufficient knowledge of the law. 
 Absence of means and channels to raise low level of awareness among citizens of their 
rights and obligations under the country’s laws, and of the state’s legal processes. 
Strengthening the provision of justice in Mali is important for several reasons. The conflict in the 
north featured atrocities committed by the state security forces, radical groups and insurgents: 
rendering justice in the north is essential to build the social contract between the state (centred in 
Bamako) and the citizens in the north (van Veen et al, 2015: 9). Across the country, atrocities 
have been committed (albeit to a lesser extent), as well as corruption and unlawful detention. 
Thus fairer and better justice is needed throughout Mali to shore up the legitimacy of the state 
and prevent social unrest (van Veen et al, 2015: 9). ‘Third, an improved justice system, with more 
opportunities for redress and greater accountability, could stimulate progress in various core 
areas relevant to development’ e.g. fairer competition for jobs in public office, more efficient 
utilisation of public funds (van Veen et al, 2018: 10). ‘Poor-quality justice reduces the ability of 
Malians to resolve their disputes peacefully, undermines the social contract between state and 
citizens, and acts as a barrier to development’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 3). 
Public perceptions of state justice system 
The state justice system is seen by many Malians as one of the most corrupt government 
institutions (van Veen et al, 2015: 40). A leaked report from the US embassy in Mali in 2009 
echoed this: ‘the judicial system is highly corrupt, with under-the-table payoffs an accepted 
manner of influencing the outcome of a case’ (cited in van Veen et al, 2015: 40). As well as 
perceiving the justice system as corrupt, van Veen et al (2015: 30) point out that Malians are 
likely to avoid it for sociocultural reasons. In Mali, taking a case to court is seen as ‘declaring war’ 
on the other party, while Malian culture prefers a more conciliatory approach. Given the other 
problems in the formal justice system – delays, inaccessibility, etc. – when a legal dispute or 
crime takes place the parties ‘will see the state justice system as a last resort’ (van Veen et al, 
2015: 30). 
Responses to the Afrobarometer Survey in Mali for 2014/2015 (Round 6) indicate that access to 
justice ‘remains severely compromised’. Key findings were as follows (Wambua & Logan, 2017: 
2):  
 Only a minority (45%) of Malians said they trusted the courts “somewhat” or “a lot”. Both 
the courts and the police (52%) were less trusted than most other public institutions in Mali, 
where religious leaders (86%) and traditional leaders (85%) enjoyed the greatest public 
trust.  
7 
 A majority (56%) of Malians said that “most” or “all” judges and magistrates were corrupt – 
the worst rating among all 36 surveyed countries2 and well above the West Africa average 
(40%).  
 Malians’ rate of contact with the justice system was very low: just 7% of citizens said they 
had dealings with the court system in the five years preceding the survey (2009-2014), the 
fourth-lowest rate among 36 surveyed countries. 
 Men were twice as likely (9%) to have contact with courts as women (4%). Young citizens 
(18-25 years old), rural residents, and those without formal education had lower levels of 
contact than older Malians, urbanites, and those with at least a primary education. 
 When asked why people might not take cases to court, Malians said they often preferred to 
take disputes to traditional leaders or local authorities (32%). Citizens also indicated that 
they did not expect fair treatment from the courts (20%), that they believed the courts 
would favour the rich and powerful (18%), and that they thought judges or other court 
officials would demand money (16%).  
In 2018 the Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HiiL) conducted a follow-up Justice Needs and 
Satisfaction (JNS) Survey in Mali (the first was carried out in 2014) to understand the justice 
needs of ordinary citizens and their paths to justice. It found that overall trust in the justice 
system in Mali was not very high, with only one in three people having confidence in the system 
(HiiL, 2019: 173). Figure 1 shows that levels of trust are much higher in customary justice 
institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) than in the state justice system. 
See Figure 1: Levels of trust in specific institutions and organisations in Mali, Source: HiiL, 2019: 
174, https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HiiL-Mali-JNS-report-EN-web.pdf  
 
Customary and religious justice  
Customary and religious justice systems in Mali are considered together in this report because 
the integration of these (influence of each on the other) is so extensive that it would be very 
difficult to completely separate them. However, individual aspects (unique to each) are 
highlighted. 
Features  
It is estimated that over 80% of family and land disputes in poor and rural communities in Mali 
are handled by customary justice systems (IDLO, 2018).  
Customary justice systems can have a range of providers (see Box 1). They all have a number of 
features which make them easily accessible (van Veen et al, 2015: 36): 
 They are convenient, because all the parties are usually located near to each other; 
 They are cheap, as no court fees or travel costs are incurred; 
                                                   
2 The 2014/2015 round of the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 36 countries across Africa, with a total of 
54,000 respondents (Wambua & Logan, 2017: 2).  
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 They are familiar, as the mediators involved in dispute settlements are usually known by 
the community, speak their language and share the same culture and religion. 
Box 1: Providers of customary justice in Mali 
Family elders 
As the basic building block of Malian society, the family represents the first level for resolving 
disputes. Conflicts are generally mediated at the initiative of the head of the family (normally the 
eldest male in the extended family) or on the request of another family member. 
Religious leaders 
Religious leaders help resolve disputes between members of their congregation. When a conflict 
occurs, the parties are called before a committee of elders – responsible for overseeing the 
institution’s activities in the community – which attempts to mediate the dispute. In the north of 
Mali, Cadi’s (religious judges) usually settle disputes. 
Traditional communicators 
Traditional communicators, known as griots in the south, are individuals invested by tradition and 
custom with the responsibility for recording and communicating the tradition and history of a 
family or community. The role of traditional communicators varies across communities, but they 
can be involved in mediating conflicts. 
Local government actors 
Neighbourhood and village heads are given authority by law to mediate civil or commercial 
disputes among citizens. Conflicts are usually referred to these authorities when they cannot be 
resolved within the family or when they threaten the stability of the community. 
Source: van Veen et al, 2015: 38. 
Goff et al’s study of customary justice mechanisms in northern Mali covered six administrative 
circles across three regions: Gao, Tombouctou and Mopti (Goff et al, 2017: 7). Gathering the 
views of a cross-section of the population in these areas, the study found that, while there were 
distinct customary justice mechanisms in each of the circles covered, they had common features 
(Goff et al, 2017: 3-4): 
 Customary justice leaders tend to be older males who already hold important roles in their 
communities. 
 Religious customary leaders usually have some formal training, but for others training can 
be non-existent or based solely on observation of other customary justice leaders.  
 In general, the leaders speak with both sides to a dispute, hear witnesses, allow each side 
to confront each other and make their decisions in a public manner without fear of 
repercussions. 
 The customary justice mechanisms handle a wide array of disputes including land, 
inheritance, theft or marital issues. Customary leaders can also refuse a case, with some 
preferring not to handle serious crimes like rape and murder, crimes related to the 2012 
crisis, boundary disputes and sorcery. 
Van Veen et al (2015: 36) note that customary justice systems are more active in areas where 
the state is not present, and the chief of the village tends to be the only real authority. In such 
places, ‘cases are not taken to the formal justice sector because there is a sense that it does not 
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exist’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 36). This is echoed by Goff et al (2017), who found that because the 
state justice system has only a weak presence in the north, customary justice systems are 
dominant there.  
Traditionally, customary justice systems have dealt with settlement and reconciliation in civil 
disputes, including family issues, resource-use conflicts and inheritance (Ursu, 2018: 2). ‘In 
recent years, these authorities have had to operate in an increasingly violent environment and 
have witnessed the expansion of the scope and type of disputes brought before them’ (Ursu, 
2018: 2). 
Mali is a predominantly Muslim country and Islamic law is sometimes incorporated into 
customary processes of mediation and reconciliation (Ursu, 2018). Inheritance claims, in 
particular, often involve the active participation of Islamic clergy and the application of Sharia 
(Islamic law) legal principles; this is recognised by the state to solve civil law disputes (Ursu, 
2018: 7). However, the imposition of Sharia law is rooted more in tradition than in ideology, and 
there is little support for applying some of the harsher punishments derived from Sharia law. Ursu 
(2018: 7) concludes: ‘not all customary justice systems apply sharia law and those systems that 
do apply it generally tend to do so in a moderate manner following traditional rather than radical 
points of view’. 
Challenges 
While having obvious advantages over the state justice system, customary justice has its own 
challenges (van Veen et al, 2015: 36): 
 Customary law reflects mostly rural, patriarchal value systems that are conservative, and 
can be incompatible with the rights granted under the country’s constitution. 
 The generally lower status of women affects their ability to negotiate on an equal footing 
with their adversaries (in law), especially their husbands. In rural areas, women and 
children often have no recognised status at all, and are therefore vulnerable in customary 
justice processes. 
 Customary justice also suffers from corruption and politicisation, albeit to a lesser extent 
that the state justice system. 
 Customary justice proceedings are generally only carried out orally, and there is no 
accountability or codification, so customary ‘judges’ can ignore precedents and create new 
ones if they wish.  
 There are many different types of customary justice mechanisms and providers in Mali, 
including family and community heads, religious leaders and specific caste members (see 
Box 1). There is significant variation by region, ethnicity and religion. 
 Enforcement of customary ‘judgements’ depends, in large part, on the willingness of the 
parties to carry them out. Because the main actors involved typically have a high level of 
authority in the community, there is a certain moral pressure on parties to respect 
agreements, and those that renege are considered ‘recalcitrant’ and ‘looked down on’ by 
society. Nonetheless, agreements are not always respected, and past disputes frequently 
resurface. 
Ursu (2018: 4-5) highlights human rights concerns with regard to customary justice systems:  
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 During the mediation process, the accused is not always granted opportunities to express 
their views or appeal decisions – in contrast to international notions of fair trials. 
 Some decisions issued by customary systems perpetuate discrimination against women 
and marginalised groups – in their desire to promote social cohesion and maintain 
traditions their decisions can maintain a conservative social order often characterised by 
patriarchal hierarchy and social inequality. 
 Customary and religious leaders might impose cruel or inhumane forms of punishment that 
conflict with basic human rights. 
On the final point, Ursu (2018: 6) notes that following the 2012 security crisis, northern regions 
and some central areas have witnessed the extensive use of Sharia (Islamic) law to resolve 
disputes. This can entail the imposition of punishments such as stoning, whipping and hand 
amputations. However, as noted above, while the Malian population is predominantly Muslim, 
they are generally moderate and tolerant in their views, and this is reflected in the application of 
Sharia law (Ursu, 2018).  
Goff et al (2017: 5) found that land issues were the most common type of dispute brought to 
customary leaders, but respondents expressed concerns that decision-making on land disputes 
could be arbitrary or lack enforcement power. A new national law passed in March 2017 
assigned specific roles to customary laws in registering land and resolving land disputes: this has 
the potential to address these weaknesses, as well as build links between the customary and 
formal justice systems (Goff et al, 2017: 5).  
Many respondents in the northern Mali study said women were marginalised or prevented from 
directly participating in customary justice mechanisms (Goff et al, 2017: 4). 
Public perceptions of customary justice systems 
In Goff et al’s study of customary justice systems in northern Mali (2015: 4), interviewees who 
had direct experience as a participant in a customary justice process reported an 84% 
satisfaction rate, and the majority of respondents spoke in favour of the continual usage of these 
systems. Respondents liked the fact that customary justice mechanisms are free, easily 
accessible and more efficient than the formal justice system. However, they can also take longer 
than the formal justice system to resolve disputes, and a lack of written decisions weakens the 
enforceability of their decisions. Respondents saw the formal justice system as more corrupt than 
customary justice mechanisms, though the latter were also viewed by many as corrupt.   
Goff et al (2017: 3) found that customary justice mechanisms were trusted in large part because 
of their ability to preserve social cohesion, whereas modern justice was seen as destroying the 
social fabric, complicating social interactions and disrespecting traditions and values. ‘As 
members of the communities they serve, customary leaders are also seen as being more aware 
of the social implications of their decisions, and more willing to take efforts to create 
compromises between parties’ (Goff et al, 2017: 3). Respondents said that, even if they 
disagreed with a decision, they would likely still adhere to it to maintain peace in the community.  
However, van Veelen et al (2015: 36) point out that respect for informal authorities is declining as 
Malian society modernises, especially in urban areas where concepts of family and cultural 
relationships have less and less value. ‘In consequence the use of customary justice 
mechanisms, as well as implementation rates of judgements they render, may see a relative 
decline in the future while remaining prominent overall’ (van Veen et al, 2015: 36).       
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Inclusion  
Women face discrimination and issues with access in both customary and state justice systems. 
Discrimination is particularly obvious at leadership level: few women are allowed to participate 
directly in customary justice provision, for example in the role of council or jury (Ursu, 2018: 5). 
With regard to seeking redress before customary leaders, women could be deterred ‘not because 
of direct prohibition but because of certain cultural and traditional boundaries that women are 
well aware of’ (Ursu, 2018: 5). A similar normative dynamic operates in relation to the formal 
justice system, where women face even more barriers to access (Ursu, 2018: 5). ‘For example, 
taking a family dispute before a state judge is perceived as a hostile act that threatens the social 
cohesion of the family and the entire community’ (Ursu, 2018: 5).  
Ursu notes that access to justice for women, whether customary or state systems, and their 
exclusion from justice reflects the generally more restricted position of women in society and 
communal norms and values. Thus: ‘Exclusion is not a symptom of the justice system per se but 
of the wider social context. Genuine reform of access to justice can therefore only come about 
through measures aimed at the social empowerment of women and vulnerable and marginalised 
groups’ (Ursu, 2018: 5). 
3. Niger 
State justice system 
Structure 
As with Mali, the justice system in Niger is based on the French legal system. It comprises lower 
criminal, civil and appeal courts, and four higher courts: the Court of Appeals, the Supreme 
Court, the High Court of Justice, and the Court of State Security. In criminal courts investigative 
judges develop and bring to trial criminal cases which they judge; appeals courts are panels of 
professional judges who hear criminal appeals. The courts of civil procedure hear lawsuits 
related to civil matters and can apply judicial remedies, while a single appellate entity is 
responsible for administrative remedies. 
The higher courts are as follows:  
 Supreme Court of Niger – the highest judicial body of the state in administrative, judicial 
and financial matters. It hears cases appealed from lower civil and criminal courts, but only 
rules on the application of the law and constitutional questions: the lower Courts of 
Appeals may decide appeals on questions of fact and law.  
 Court of Appeals of Niger – there is one in each of Niger's eight regions. They review 
questions of fact and law in criminal and civil law, and rulings may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Niger.  
 Constitutional Court of Niger – has jurisdiction over constitutional and electoral matters, 
and rules on compliance with international treaties and agreements. The Court includes 
seven members and can be called upon to provide rulings by certain constitutional triggers 
(elections, referendum, constitution revision) or on the request of – among others – the 
President. When called upon to give binding rulings it is the final arbiter, and rulings must 
be carried out in 30 days. It came into prominence when required to offer a non-binding 
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ruling of President Mamadou Tandja’s plan for a referendum on a new constitution. Its 
opposition, presented on 26 May 2009, triggered the President's dismissal of the National 
Assembly.  
 High Court of Justice – crimes or misdemeanours committed by government officials in the 
exercise of their office are tried here. This court is composed of seven deputies elected 
from within the National Assembly on a provisional basis, and organised and instructed by 
the Supreme Court of Niger.  
 State Security Court – a military court for trying offences committed by the military and 
police, but also initially enabling the military of Niger to try civilians accused of crimes 
touching upon state secrets, defence, espionage, or internal security. It was closed by the 
National Assembly in 1991 but some elements of the court were re-established in 2007 – 
though it can no longer try civilians.  
Challenges 
Corruption is a major problem in the Niger judiciary (US State Dept., 2015; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2018). Examples include family and business ties influencing lower-court decisions in civil 
matters. A 2016 Afrobarometer survey reported that 34% of respondents experienced problems 
in dealing with the courts such as paying bribes, delays and lack of access, though this was 
below the African average of around 40% (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 10).  
Niger further suffers from a lack of authorised lawyers. Fighting for one’s rights in a court of law is 
very expensive: the vast majority of the population either does not have access to the legal 
system or cannot afford the legal fees. Defendants have the right to counsel (at public expense 
for minors and indigent defendants charged with serious crimes), the right to be present at trial, 
to be informed of all the evidence against them, and to appeal verdicts. However, widespread 
ignorance of the law prevents many accused from taking full advantage of these rights (US State 
Dept., 2015: 6). Moreover, the limited number of jurisdictions, staff shortages and lack of 
resources, can lead to significant judicial delays, leaving large numbers of detainees awaiting 
trial for long periods (US State Dept., 2015: 6). 
Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary in Niger, the executive 
does sometimes interfere with the judicial process (US State Dept., 2015). The government 
reassigned some judges to low-profile positions after they asserted independence in handling 
high-profile cases or rendered decisions unfavourable to the government (US State Dept., 2015: 
6). There were also allegations the government interfered or attempted to interfere in high-profile 
court cases involving the leadership of opposition parties.  
The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have a long tradition of rulings that contradict 
executive decisions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 10). In the 1990s and during the Tandja regime 
(1999–2010), the judiciary often demanded that the executive review laws. In recent years, 
however, the judiciary has been ‘remarkably silent’ and this has led to a reported reduction in 
interference by the executive (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 9). Furthermore, rulings by the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court are often simply ignored (US State Dept., 2015). High-
ranking politicians are rarely subject to judicial action; if and when they are subject to 
investigation, cases are either abandoned or delayed indefinitely. If politicians are prosecuted, 
this is normally a sign that they have fallen out of favour with whomever is in charge of the 
executive (US State Dept., 2015). Judges granted provisional release pending trial to some high-
profile defendants, who were seldom called back for trial and had complete freedom of 
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movement, could leave the country, and could even run as candidates in elections (US State 
Dept., 2015). Similarly, officeholders who break the law and engage in corrupt practices often 
attract adverse publicity, but are not adequately prosecuted. Trials of officeholders are often 
informed by political considerations (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 10). 
Public perceptions of state justice system 
The Afrobarometer Round 6 survey of public perceptions of the legal system in Niger found that 
the country’s court system enjoys the highest level of public trust among 36 African countries 
surveyed in 2014/2015 (Wambua & Logan, 2017: 1). Perceptions of corruption among judges, 
while substantial, were lower than regional and continental averages. Among the 9% of Nigeriens 
who reported having contact with the judicial system in the previous five years, the most common 
problems were long delays and the system’s complexity (Wambua & Logan, 2017: 1). 
Key findings were as follows (Wambua & Logan, 2017: 2):  
 More than eight in 10 Nigeriens (82%) said they trusted the courts “somewhat” or “a lot”. 
This was the highest rating among all 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, and far 
above the West Africa average of 48%.  
 Like the courts, the police were among public institutions that enjoyed a high level of public 
trust (86%) in Niger, surpassed only by religious leaders (93%), the army (92%), and 
traditional leaders (88%). 
 About one in four Nigeriens (23%) said that “most” or “all” judges and magistrates were 
corrupt. This was one of the best ratings among 36 countries, well below the West Africa 
average of 40%.  
 About one in 11 Nigeriens (9%) said they had dealings with the court system in the five 
years preceding the survey (2009-2014), somewhat below the 36-country average of 13%. 
 Men were twice as likely (12%) to have contact with courts as women (6%). Economically 
well-off respondents (i.e. those with “no lived poverty”) were less likely to have dealings 
with the court than their poorer counterparts.  
 When asked why people might not take cases to court, Nigeriens said that people often 
preferred to take disputes to traditional leaders or local authorities (23%), they didn’t 
expect fair treatment from the courts (14%), they didn’t know how to take a case to court 
(13%), or they didn’t know their legal rights (13%). 
 Respondents who had interacted with the courts during the previous five years were asked 
which problems they encountered. As across West Africa and across all 36 surveyed 
countries, long delays were the most common problem, cited by 69% of Nigeriens. The 
complexity of the legal system was also a common problem (50%). A lack of legal advice, 
inattentive judges, and high costs were less frequently cited as difficulties in Niger than 
elsewhere in West Africa or across the continent. 
Customary and religious justice  
Traditional mediation and customary courts play an important role in the justice system in Niger. 
The country’s legal framework provides that the courts should apply the customs of the parties in 
disputes related to contracts, the status of persons, family matters, inheritance and gifts, and real 
estate, but not all civil issues (OHCHR, 2016: 34; US State Dept., 2015: 6). Indeed, it is normally 
thought of as ‘disturbance of the local peace’ to bring a person before a court, and the parties are 
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encouraged and in some types of cases required to attempt to settle the matter within the 
traditional justice structure before bringing a case to the formal courts (OHCHR, 2016: 35). There 
are two reasons for this: one, to promote harmony and conciliation through the traditional dispute 
resolution process; and, two, to relieve the caseload of the formal courts. 
Normally dispute resolution is first attempted through the traditional chiefs (OHCHR, 2016). 
Chiefs receive government stipends but have no police or judicial powers (US State Dept., 2015). 
There is a structured hierarchy of traditional chiefs: those in villages or in specific subdivisions of 
villages, and higher up chiefs of larger geographic areas (at cantonal level) (OHCHR, 2016: 35). 
Customary courts, based largely on Islamic law, try only civil law cases. A legal practitioner with 
basic legal training, advised by a (or two) customary assessor(s) with knowledge of the traditions 
of the disputants, heads these courts. The customary assessors are proposed by/are the 
traditional chiefs of the pertinent area to the court of first instance. The court can reject certain 
candidates and the Ministry of Justice makes the final selection on the basis of the list of 
candidates sent by the chief judge of the court.  
In practice, the customary assessors are relied upon not only for their knowledge of local 
customs, but also for evaluating the evidence and the context of the dispute. The customary 
assessors have an important role as they stay in the community, while the judges (legal 
practitioners) of the court rotate geographically. The former are normally closely associated with 
the chiefs and other elders and speak the language of the community, whereas the latter may not 
(OHCHR, 2016). The customary assessors are thus seen as a key intermediary between the 
formal courts and the chiefs and other elders of a particular community, and not only advise on 
customs in the community and help evaluate the evidence, but also transmit the judgment of the 
court back to the community (OHCHR, 2016: 35). 
Traditional mediation and customary courts do not provide the same legal protections as the 
formal court system. Formal law does not regulate the judicial actions of chiefs and customary 
courts, although defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal court system (US State Dept., 
2015: 6).  
Inclusion  
Outside the capital Niamey, citizens have almost no legal recourse. Access to legal protection is 
very expensive and thus impossible for 95% of the population (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11). 
Despite constitutional protections, nomadic peoples have little or no access to government 
services. Significant traditional structures prevent large segments of the population from 
expressing their civil rights. Women have equal legal status with men in the formal court system, 
but not in customary courts and traditional mediation and do not enjoy the same access to legal 
redress (US State Dept., 2015: 6). Family law gives women inferior status in property disputes. In 
the eastern part of the country, women among the Hausa and Peul (also known as Fulani or 
Fulbe) communities are often not allowed to leave their homes without a male escort 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11). In the Diffa region, the military confrontation between the 
Nigerien state and Boko Haram has displaced thousands of people, who are without sufficient 
legal protection (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11).  
15 
4. Burkina Faso 
State justice system 
Structure 
Burkina Faso’s legal system is based on the French legal system and on customary law.  
The formal justice system comprises the Court of Cassation at the top, which is the superior 
jurisdiction of the judicial order, and the High Court of Justice (ISSAT, 2020). The latter 
comprises deputies that the National Assembly elects after each general renewal, as well as the 
magistrates designated by the president of the Court of Cassation (ISSAT, 2020). Judicial courts 
are available in every region.  
Challenges 
A US State Department report on human rights in Burkina Faso describes the judiciary as, 
‘corrupt, inefficient and subject to executive influence….Legal codes remained outdated, there 
were not enough courts, and legal costs were excessive. Citizens’ poor knowledge of their rights 
further weakened their ability to obtain justice’ (US State Dept., 2017: 8). Again, this is echoed by 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018, 12): ‘the right to fair trial is limited by popular ignorance of the law 
and a continuing shortage of magistrates’. The number of magistrates in 2018 was 559, including 
115 female magistrates (ISSAT, 2020). The ratio of magistrates per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018 
was 2.5; this ratio is below the internationally recommended standard of 10 magistrates per 
100,000 inhabitants (ISSAT, 2020). Furthermore, ‘Cases of long-term detention without trial or 
access to legal counsel are widespread. Equality before the law and due process under the law 
exist in theory, but, in practice, it is often only citizens with financial means who can secure a fair 
or speedy trial’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 12). ‘The judicial system suffers from corruption, 
which stems from an overall system that is inefficient, poorly trained and poorly equipped. The 
economic vulnerability of its members makes them susceptible to exploitation’ (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2018: 11).  
The judiciary in Burkina Faso are free according to the constitution, but judges are accountable 
to the President which makes their status ambivalent (ISSAT, 2020). Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
2018 report echoes this: ‘The judiciary is formally independent and institutionally distinct but 
dominated and politicized in practice by the executive branch. The executive orchestrates judicial 
appointments and promotions, and prosecutors are part of a hierarchy headed by the justice 
minister; because of this, the executive interferes in judicial decisions’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2018: 11). The judiciary operate under ‘extreme political pressure’, seen for example, in court 
proceedings being very slow when powerful people are involved, but very quick when they serve 
the government’s interests (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11). This has resulted in a culture of 
impunity among government officials (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). 
Public perceptions of state justice system 
This review found little information on public perceptions of the justice sector in Burkina Faso. 
The Afrobarometer Round 7 survey, published in 2017, is in French, but appeared to contain 
nothing on the justice sector beyond asking if the President should not interfere in judicial 
decisions, even where he thinks they are wrong, and whether he should respect judicial 
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decisions, even where he things they are wrong (Afrobarometer, 2017: 20). According to the 
2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung report, fighting government officials’ impunity has ranked among the 
population’s main demands since the 1998 murder of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo, but 
the judiciary has only hesitantly moved toward solving this or other crimes with suspected 
government involvement (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 11). According to the 2019 Global 
Corruption Barometer for Africa, around one-third of Burkinabe perceive judges and magistrates 
to be corrupt (cited in ISSAT, 2020). 
Customary and religious justice  
This review found no information about customary and religious justice in Burkina Faso.  
5. Chad 
State justice system 
Structure 
The legal system is based on French civil law, but the constitution recognises traditional law in 
locales where it is long established, provided local law does not interfere with public order or 
constitutional provisions for equality of citizens (US State Dept., 2015). Courts tend to blend the 
formal French-derived legal code with traditional practices.  
Challenges 
The US State Dept.’s 2015 report on human rights in Chad found that residents of rural areas 
and refugee/internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps often lacked access to formal judicial 
institutions, and legal reference texts were not available outside the capital or in Arabic. Major 
problems with the judiciary include underfunding, overburdened with cases and corruption (US 
State Dept., 2015; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Courts generally are weak and, in some areas, 
non-existent (US State Dept., 2015). ‘Ordinary citizens generally avoid the courts, as they do not 
trust the judicial system and fear that any charges filed might backfire against them’ 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 13).  
Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the judiciary is subject to 
executive interference. ‘Members of the judiciary sometimes received death threats or were 
demoted for not acquiescing to pressure from officials. Government officials, particularly 
members of the military, often were able to avoid prosecution’ (US State Dept., 2015: 6). This is 
echoed by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018: 13): ‘Judges acting independently face severe 
intimidation or dismissal’. A judicial oversight commission has the power to investigate judicial 
decisions and address suspected miscarriages of justice, but its members are appointed by the 
President, increasing executive control of the judiciary (US State Dept., 2015: 7). Government 
officials and other influential persons, especially members of the governing-party clan, often 
enjoy impunity; where they are sentenced or fined, it is obvious that the punishment is the result 
of behind-the-scenes power struggles (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 13). 
The challenges with the justice sector can lead to people taking the law into their own hands. In 
the south of Chad, conflicts over land ownership between pastoralists and herders continue to 
lead to the violation of rights, and violence resulting in injuries and deaths. As the judiciary does 
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not offer any redress for injustice, farmers that feel wronged attempt to take justice into their own 
hands (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 14). This exacerbates conflict as herders, who often have 
ties to the ruling elite, respond to the violent actions from farmers with greater violence often with 
the backing of state agencies (e.g. police, gendarmerie or military) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 
14).  
Customary and religious justice  
Customary law often supersedes Napoleonic (French) law (US State Dept., 2015: 7). In minor 
civil cases, the population often rely on traditional courts presided over by village chiefs, canton 
chiefs, or sultans. Penalties in traditional courts sometimes depend on the clan affiliations of the 
victim and perpetrator. Decisions of traditional courts may be appealed to in a formal court.  
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